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Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015)1 is an 
extraordinary piece of work, looking back to the co-evolution of law, the state and the 
technology of the printing press, and forward to the contribution that smart 
technologies of machine learning, big data, artificial agents and pre-emptive 
environments will make to our society and the threats they make to us individuals (the 
onlife world).
2
 As incisive points and dry witticisms pile up in the text, the reader will 
no doubt wish to engage with many issues – privacy,3 data protection, the nature of 
law and its enforcement, technological determinism, to name only the most 
prominent. 
For my own part, Smart Technologies presents history at an inflection point, where 
technology has the capacity to introduce a step-change in our relations with our 
selves, our fellows and our society. Hildebrandt defends our plural society with an 
agonistic reading, resisting the Rawlsian project of developing consensus, and instead 
suggesting a Mouffe-like position of accepting, even welcoming conflict. Reference 
points in the text include Latour, Butler, Derrida and Ricoeur (though fortunately she 
is infinitely more readable than these luminaries). 
Yet the focus on forthcoming change implies that a more interesting philosophical 
lens would be conservatism, the ideology that problematizes and examines social 
change. And indeed, reading Smart Technologies through conservative spectacles 
results in many insights into the politics of technology, conservatism and 
Hildebrandt’s work as well. Hildebrandt herself may be horrified at this thought, and 
conservative thinkers (with the possible exception of Hannah Arendt whom I would 
                                                 
1
 All references to this work will appear as page numbers in brackets. All emphases (in all quotes) are 
the authors’ own. 
2
 The onlife world is a neologism describing these new circumstances. One is supposed to write it with 
an irritating italic ‘f’, but hopefully this typological solecism can be safely ignored. 
3
 I certainly take issue with a number of things she has to say on this point, although as Hildebrandt 
reasonably sees privacy as an essentially contested concept (188), that is perhaps to be expected. I hope 
to explore this topic on a future occasion, and (O’Hara forthcoming) did manage to engage a little with 
her arguments. For example, I think, though this is not the place to pursue the argument, that she gives 
personal data stores or personal data environments too short a shrift in this book (202). 
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also like to claim for the tradition)
4
 are absent from the text. Nevertheless, in this 
paper I will argue that a conservative reading of Smart Technologies is both 
appropriate and illuminating. 
In its scope, scale and ambition, Smart Technologies brings Michael Oakeshott’s 
masterwork On Human Conduct (1975)
5
 to mind, and in many ways updates that 
statement of liberal conservatism for the 21
st
 century. Both books focus on human 
decision-making and action at the individual level, the use and purpose of law for 
constraining action, and the role of the law and the state for creating the circumstances 
for autonomous, authentic, free individuals to flourish. Oakeshott’s themes of human 
behaviour and civil association, and modernity’s challenges to individuality, are 
replicated and extended in Hildebrandt’s work. Nevertheless, such is the modern 
hegemony of liberalism, Oakeshott is not referenced in Smart Technologies. 
My paper has three further sections. To begin with, I will briefly review conservatism 
and relate it to liberalism. Next, I will work through many of the prominent themes of 
On Human Conduct, and relate them to themes in Smart Technologies. Finally, I will 
consider ways in which Hildebrandt’s work challenges and extends Oakeshott, while 
remaining within the conservative tradition. 
Liberalism and conservatism 
In a number of countries at least, conservatism and liberalism are often confused. 
There is a reason that this is surprising, and two reasons why it is not. The surprise is 
that the spirits of the two ideologies are diametrically opposed, as Hayek argued 
trenchantly in his famous essay ‘Why I am not a conservative’ (1960). The liberal 
welcomes change, experiment and creative destruction; new opportunities come from 
disruption of old, tired ways of thinking. The conservative, on the other hand, is timid, 
clings to old ways and traditions and is pessimistic and resisting of the unfamiliar, 
untried or unproven. 
Yet equally, these two dissimilar ideologies often make common cause. Socialism, 
identity politics, nationalism and other critical ideologies advocating targeted social 
change offend both conservatives and liberals. The liberal decries the suppression of 
the individual (in the name of equality, or greenery, or feminism, or the nation), while 
the conservative is exercised by the undervaluation and intended destruction of 
existing institutions. 
More subtly, conservatism is a situational ideology (Huntington 1957); it is not 
concerned with any particular ends as such, but rather problematizes change (Freeden 
1996, O’Hara 2011). Consequently, the conservative will defend the political 
settlement that is in place, as long as it is a settlement; a conservative in Tehran would 
defend very different institutions to a conservative in Paris or Washington, while 
using parallel arguments. And a conservative in a liberal nation will find herself 
defending liberal institutions (Brennan & Hamlin 2014, O’Hara 2011). There is 
nothing contradictory in the idea of conservatives and liberals joining together to 
defend liberal institutions, if those liberal institutions are in place and functioning. But 
they will use different arguments; the liberal typically going from universal first 
principles, while the conservative will argue from the successful function of the 
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 Hildebrandt and Arendt on the team would also go quite some way to redressing the regrettable 
gender imbalance in the ranks of conservative philosophy. 
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 In this paper references to pages in On Human Conduct will be page numbers preceded by OHC. I am 
also indebted to the exegesis of (Digeser & Flathman 2012). 
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institutions in the particular historical moment (e.g. of 21
st
 century multicultural 
Europe), without admitting or advocating that her argument will carry across time and 
space (Gray 1993b). 
Conservatism itself is an epistemological philosophy, sceptical towards the claims of 
science and social science (Oakeshott 1991), and arguing that rationalist philosophers 
and politicians systematically undervalue functioning institutions and traditions in 
society, however irrational (or even unjust) they may appear on the surface, while 
overvaluing their own abilities to reshape society to their preferred blueprint (Burke 
1968). Consequently, the aim of conservatism is not to prevent or block change, but 
rather to place the burden of proof on the innovator, and to ensure that social change 
is (a) incremental, (b) reversible where possible, and (c) rigorously evaluated (O’Hara 
2011). 
On Human Conduct 
Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) was a thinker on the borderline between liberalism 
and conservatism, and is often claimed as a liberal thinker (Gray 1993a). In fact, he 
defended Britain’s (especially England’s) liberal constitution using conservative 
arguments. In this section, I will explore some of the parallels between Oakeshott’s 
major work On Human Conduct and Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies, before 
considering how she moves the agenda on in a final section. 
Plurality and Agency 
Oakeshott’s starting point was the pluralism of a modern society, where citizens, 
groups, associations, enterprises, religions and ideologies compete for space, attention 
and air time, defending their own practices, gathering resources and persuading others 
of their merits. A healthy society could easily be quite fractious, and Oakeshott’s 
purpose was to understand how such a plurality could sustain and reproduce itself, 
without imposing consensus, even as society members were in perpetual conflict. 
Influenced by his own Hegelian idealism (Oakeshott 1933), Oakeshott argued that the 
notion of aggregating this plural cacophony was incoherent or unintelligible 
(OHC12). 
One of his most noticeable traits as a philosopher was his tendency to understand a 
problematic area by postulating a distinction to scope his inquiry. The notion of 
agency was an example of this – understanding human action or behaviour depends 
on whether that which was understood is “an exhibition of intelligence or not” 
(OHC11). Once it is decided that agency is in play, then idioms of inquiry apply, such 
as ethics, politics or aesthetics, although Oakeshott was firm that these idioms had 
clear lines of demarcation. 
Human action, then, involves an “imagined and wished-for satisfaction”, and a 
judgment about whether the satisfaction could take place in current circumstances. In 
Oakeshott’s day, agency was an exclusively human trait, although of course 
philosophers were already trying to extend the concept. A key contribution of 
Hildebrandt’s work is the development of a convincing notion of artificial agency. 
Oakeshott used this idea of agency to support his own pluralism. First of all, he 
argued that there were no facts to determine the proper limits of agency – there were 
no rights and wrongs, fundamentally, about beliefs, desires and purposes. And 
secondly, “where conduct is the choice and pursuit of substantive conditions of things 
every achievement is evanescent” so that “every satisfaction is casual and late or soon 
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a casualty” (OHC84). In short, in practical life so much is going on that it will make 
little sense from any perspective other than the specific subjective and partial position 
of individuals. We might add with Hildebrandt that, in our technology-mediated 
modernity, our perceptions of reality are altering all the time, so that our 
hyperconnectivity is reconfiguring our perceived environment and the set of choices 
we can make (50). 
Oakeshott’s idea of evanescent achievement leads to another distinction, between a 
collective and a collected state of affairs (OHC86-87). Oakeshott rejects collective 
enterprises as inimical to pluralism and therefore inherently totalitarian, and focuses 
instead on the collected inheritance of myriad interactions between individuals and 
civil society groups. “It is not Man who relieves the ills of an invalid, nor is it some 
abstraction called ‘medical science’; the healer is a specific practitioner who has 
learned his art, not from Society, but from particular teachers” (OHC87). Broadly 
congruent desires and satisfactions create the conditions for the reproduction of a 
pluralistic society, as traditions, institutions and practices evolve as conventions, 
norms or regularities which are widely understood and exploited by individuals to 
achieve their satisfactions and resolve their conflicts. Any interaction between two 
individuals, however evanescent in itself, will typically exploit a palette of well-
understood practices and constraints within which the interaction can be tailored for 
mutual benefit, without actually determining what that benefit might be. 
Oakeshott calls the ability to act within a collected state of affairs effective freedom or 
liberty. Effective freedom is not simply a lack of coercion, but corresponds to Berlin’s 
positive liberty, though placing much more weight on the notions of agency and 
responsibility and the idea of individuals as achieving their own satisfaction in a 
plural society. Whereas Berlin’s positive liberty was a type of self-mastery, 
Oakeshott’s effective freedom is founded in the abilities of individuals to negotiate 
the collected state of affairs, understand its affordances, interpret their own interests 
within it, and develop coalitions of allies (perhaps via debate and effective advocacy 
of their own position), in order to adapt their satisfactions to better achieve them. The 
problem Hildebrandt presents us with is that, in the modern era, the technology that 
profiles and pre-empts us may leave us short of the reciprocity and ambiguity that 
autonomous individuals require to communicate, and ultimately to exercise their 
effective freedom (67). 
Practice 
As they are discussed, replicated and even theorised about, practices, for Oakeshott, 
become recognisable and semi-formal, even acquiring a kind of informal authority, 
without determining what people do or what activities they take part in (OHC56). To 
take part in a practice may involve using it to achieve the satisfaction desired. 
The practice may also be associated with a set of norms (especially when it involves 
many agents), and what Oakeshott calls the morality of self-disclosure depends on an 
individual staying or not staying within the normative bounds of the practice. For 
example, in an exam, the individual basically wants to pass, but the practice of 
examination also includes a set of normative principles that only accepts a pass under 
certain conditions (e.g. without cheating – OHC76). The individual discloses himself 
within such a practice, depending on whether he remains within the normative bounds 
or not. Such bounds, though obviously fragile in a selfish world both for the 
individual (who might fail the exam if he respects them) and for others (who will be 
disadvantaged if cheating is widespread), are important for disseminating trust across 
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societies (OHC73). Such practices give a social structure to a person’s enacting 
“himself as he wishes to be” (OHC72). Self-enactment relative to a practice involves 
accepting the norms of that practice and respecting them as far as possible. The 
outcome for a cheat and for a non-cheat may be identical, but the latter is virtuous in a 
way that the former is not (OHC73). 
Practices, therefore, as characteristic of collected states of affairs rather than 
collectives, have two crucial functions. First of all, they give individuals a palette of 
actions and behaviours which facilitate the negotiation of the complexities of plural 
existence. Secondly, they provide a locus for the individual to enact himself as a 
virtuous and social person, able play a full part as a trustworthy member of civil 
associations. 
An important contribution of Smart Technologies is Hildebrandt’s understanding of 
technology as practice in this sense, and the dangers of going beyond the 
Oakeshottian notion in such a way as to undermine self-enactment. No-one is forced, 
she writes, to use a mobile phone, and those who do can use it to support or pursue 
many types of satisfaction or goal. “But once defaults have settled resistance becomes 
more difficult and expectations of how things are done consolidate” (11). 
Furthermore, the development of practice is advanced, if that is the right word, by 
technologies of pre-emption and profiling. “Roles, institutions and cultural patterns 
[roughly what Oakeshott refers to as practice] are tied up with predictions; they help 
to predict how other agents will probably behave” (58). She notes the distancing 
effect of the printed word in the development of practice, and how what Oakeshott 
calls effective freedom depends on “specific mental skills, such as sound 
argumentation, sustained sequential reasoning and the willingness to give an account 
of one’s choices by providing reasons” (58). One needs to embrace autonomy, control 
and accountability in the post-Gutenberg world. She adds that technology that 
predicts, aggregates and pre-empts our choices and actions will forever change that 
world; a new set of practices is being subtended so that effective freedom may require 
a whole new set of skills (59ff.), and will be protected only partially by data 
protection rights (187). 
The individual v the individual manqué 
Individuality, for Oakeshott, goes beyond agency; it involves embracing the 
possibilities of agency and taking up opportunities for adventure and exploration. 
With his penchant for deep historical analysis, tracing the genealogy of political 
concepts and practices, he argued that individuality and effective freedom in this 
adventurous sense is a relatively recent phenomenon, and that the usual condition of 
liberty for most of human history was if anything something of a burden. Effective 
freedom for an individual taking full advantage of one’s agency is the condition for 
autonomy, not in the sense of defining one’s own rules (as the Nietzschean 
Übermensch), but in the sense being authentically one’s self (OHC237). 
This condition contrasts with that of what Oakeshott called the ‘individual manqué’ 
(OHC275), who longs “for the shelter of a community”, distrusts his own instincts, 
and recedes into a heteronomous condition where his desires and satisfactions are set 
out for him by external agencies. The individual manqué is unable or unwilling to 
make the major investment in resources to self-enact as an individual, and to explore 
his own individuality, and for Oakeshott this is the outcome of a moral failing. The 
individual manqué is a danger to plurality, as someone who will be resentful of the 
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difference which will follow from individuals ignoring the authorities for and sources 
of his own desires and beliefs. 
Hildebrandt agrees that the fallen individual is damaged by pre-emption of actions 
and patterns of action, “handy and comfortable” though it may be (51). However, 
despite the reference to the sacrifice of comfort for individuality, she is more 
sympathetic towards individuals manqués than Oakeshott, and an interpretation of her 
thesis is that recession into heteronomy is happening covertly via technologies which 
“conflate time and space into a synchronized environment that allows for ‘always on’ 
real-time accessibility.” As in Huxley’s Brave New World, the individual manqué has 
been suckered into his supine position, rather than meekly surrendering as Oakeshott 
argues. 
It is extraordinary – to take another conservative liberal philosopher – to consider the 
accuracy of Tocqueville’s warnings in this context. The decontextualized individual 
of the onlife world (1-15), with smartphone, personal agent and portable infotainment, 
whisked from home to office to airport by driverless car, close to but remote from his 
fellows, is conjured up in this passage from 1840 about the new kinds of soft 
despotism we might expect in the new democracies. 
I wish to imagine under what new features despotism might appear in the world: 
I see an innumerable crowd of men, all alike and equal, turned in upon 
themselves in a restless search for those petty, vulgar pleasures with which they 
fill their souls. Each of them, living apart, is almost unaware of the destiny of all 
the rest. His children and personal friends are for him the whole of the human 
race; as for the remainder of his fellow citizens, he stands alongside them but 
does not see them; he touches them without feeling them; he exists only in 
himself and for himself; if he still retains his family circle, at any rate he may be 
said to have lost his country. (de Tocqueville 2003, vol.2, part 4, chapter 6, 
805). 
This vision prefigures Hildebrandt’s own argument that the data-driven view of 
society brings a new type of perception in which “even our immediate surroundings 
are being mediated, especially when engaging with mobile applications that provide 
us with ‘augmented reality’” (50). Tocqueville, like Oakeshott, was suspicious of 
democracy. Hildebrandt embraces it, as do most modern conservative thinkers, but 
recognises the importance of resisting the slide into the condition Tocqueville 
describes. Can she square the circle? 
One important contribution of her work is to refuse to accept existing economic 
incentives to frame the bigger picture, as it is these incentives that are producing the 
onlife world’s individuals manqués. There will certainly be costs and benefits to any 
kind of shift away from the current model of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2015), 
but Hildebrandt is clear that only “after determining what normativity we need to 
survive as reasonably free and reasonably constrained individual persons, we can 
decide how to distribute the costs as well as the benefits” (15). 
The stakes are certainly high. In a continuation of the above passage, Tocqueville 
describes the opportunity for power that individuals manqués provide. 
Above these men stands an immense and protective power which alone is 
responsible for looking after their enjoyments and watching over their destiny. 
It is absolute, meticulous, ordered, provident, and kindly disposed. It would be 
like a fatherly authority, if, fatherlike, its aim were to prepare men for manhood, 
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but it seeks only to keep them in perpetual childhood; it prefers its citizens to 
enjoy themselves provided they have only enjoyment in mind. It works readily 
for their happiness but it wishes to be the only provider and judge of it. It 
provides their security, anticipates and guarantees their needs, supplies their 
pleasures, directs their principal concerns, manages their industry, regulates 
their estates, divides their inheritances. Why can it not remove from them 
entirely the bother of thinking and the troubles of life? 
Thus, it reduces daily the value and frequency of the exercise of free choice; it 
restricts the activity of free will within a narrower range and gradually removes 
autonomy itself from each citizen. Equality has prepared men for all this, 
inclining them to tolerate all these things and often even to see them as a 
blessing. (de Tocqueville 2003, 805-806). 
Civil association, social machines and the state 
Oakeshott’s main purpose in On Human Conduct is to describe how individuals can 
form into groups without losing the plurality inherent in their pursuit of their own 
satisfactions. To that end, he introduces the key concept of civil association 
(OHC108-184), a self-sufficient, ‘constituted’ (i.e. rule-based, with a system of 
adjudication, however informal) relationship of equal free agents (OHC110). This 
involves: 
… ‘free’ (that is, intelligent) agents disclosing and enacting themselves by 
responding to their understood contingent situations in chosen actions and 
utterances related to imagined and wished-for satisfactions sought in the 
responses of other such agents, while subscribing to the conditions and 
compunctions of a multitude of practices and in particular to those of a language 
of moral understanding and intercourse. (OHC112) 
An association may exist to complete a purpose or pursue a goal, but to be a civil 
association it must have no function other than to allow people to interact in a well-
understood way. It is my contention that Hildebrandt is best understood as aiming to 
preserve something like this complex condition of civil association, without 
overriding goal, in the onlife world. 
There is nothing wrong with an association designed to pursue a particular end. 
Oakeshott calls these enterprise associations (OHC114), and characterises them as a 
“community of choices”, in which people congregate in order to cooperate to achieve 
a goal. Effective freedom includes the ability to identify and join such associations. 
Such cooperative behaviour can be found online as well, of course, as social machines 
(Hendler & Berners-Lee 2010). 
The idea of social machines brings in the notion of design, which for robust 
libertarians and existentialists has a totalitarian ring. Norman Mailer, for example 
(who self-identified as a ‘left conservative’), uses the phrase to skewer bien-pensant 
thinking in liberal America, for instance describing the denizens of a smart dinner 
party as “servants of that social machine of the future in which all irrational human 
conflict would be resolved, all conflict of interest negotiated, and nature’s resonance 
condensed into frequencies that could comfortably phase nature in or out as you 
please” (Mailer 1968). 
Oakeshott maintains that the state is, at bottom, a civil association (not a machine or a 
managerial entity), and traces its evolution from medieval court to modernity 
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(OHC185-326). In particular, this moves us toward the idea of two different kinds of 
state, which he distinguishes through a detailed if idiosyncratic reading of European 
constitutional history. The state as societas provides security and creates the 
conditions for the individual to flourish. It holds the ring between different citizens, 
and attempts to make it possible for plurality, dispute and dispute resolution to occur, 
via well-understood traditions and practices. The state as universitas instead pursues 
particular enterprises (policies), and subordinates individuality to those policies. Such 
a state has a cause, a purpose, or an aim. 
Neither Oakeshott nor Tocqueville anticipated that this amount of power could also 
devolve to a private actor (cf. 75).
6
 There is no reason that it shouldn’t, as the power 
Tocqueville envisages is not coercive in the traditional sense, and not underpinned by 
a monopoly on legitimate violence. Surveillance capitalism requires only a powerful 
enough body to spread itself across most aspects of the lives of most people – it could 
be a private company, but no-one anticipated Google until Google appeared. As 
Tocqueville predicted, such powers are not judgmental; Google and Facebook are 
quite pleased for people to be happy, want them to be, and do not judge the means by 
which they are made happy, as long as they are the agents and arbiters of the 
happiness. 
Reciprocity and reflection 
Reciprocity with other agents in the association is essential, as the individual responds 
to what she understands of the situation (OHC114). When the full position is not 
available to an agent, then her effective freedom is impaired. For instance, Oakeshott 
uses the example of a punter and a bookmaker entering into the practice of putting a 
bet on a horse (OHC115). The practice does not determine which horse to choose, or 
what odds the bookmaker should offer – these decisions made within the practice 
determine the particular transaction. It is implicit – Oakeshott does not consider this –
that the horse in question, and any other horse in the race, has not been doped. If the 
race has been fixed, then a different practice is underway and punter, bookmaker or 
both may be misled about what will happen on the racecourse. 
In the onlife world, Hildebrandt argues that a system that takes one’s first order 
preferences for granted, catering for them before one is aware of them, diminishes 
one’s capacity to reflect on habits and desires, and therefore one’s capacity to remake 
oneself in order to improve as a person (by one’s own standards) (92). Data for 
profiling and pre-emption is much more easily available for the owner of the 
databases and software than the individual data subject, which is crucial because the 
data will produce non-obvious knowledge about matters such as creditworthiness, 
health or employability (101), again creating an asymmetrical position. The actual 
affordances of technology matter, not those that are perceived, as some of the former 
may be hidden (170). In such a world legal expertise is displaced by data expertise, 
which is worrying because, unlike lawyers who are paid to advise clients who are 
fully aware of their involvement in a legal case, data scientists are generally funded by 
the data consumers, thereby exacerbating the asymmetry (182). Furthermore, 
important social protections – such as the socialisation of risk via insurance or related 
industries (194) – may disappear, replaced by individual responsibility. 
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It is, however, hard to agree with Hildebrandt’s suggestion (222-224) that counter-
profiling the profilers will help redress the balance. Quite apart from complex issues 
such as data gathering and interfaces, the problem in the cases discussed above is 
sometimes reciprocity (our awareness of our interlocutors’ purposes and beliefs about 
us), but more usually the (non-relational) lack of a space in which to understand 
ourselves and reflect. The asymmetry between what I know about me and what 
Google knows about me may be a problem in my relationship with Google, but is 
certainly an issue for me. I could know so much more, and don’t. 
In any case, transparency about the self following from the collection and analysis of 
personal data “can be an infringement of privacy, because one is forced to confront 
knowledge about oneself that disrupts the future” (74). This very fact forces one to 
choose between knowing or not knowing, say, the sex of one’s baby or the risks 
associated with one’s genome. 
Law and authority 
Not all associations promote enterprises. Oakeshott writes of civil associations 
constituted by subscription to rules of engagement which constrain how individuals in 
the association (cives)
7
 go about pursuing their own satisfactions. A civil association 
is brought together by a manner of doing things (rather than a goal), and the rules 
governing the manner of its members’ interactions and pursuits make up the law (lex). 
The civil association is created precisely through recognition of the law as 
authoritative. 
Oakeshott conceives of the state (as societas) as a civil association, and so the lex of 
that particular association is the law as we understand it, and which concerns 
Hildebrandt. For Oakeshott, there is no narrative about law beyond this (this is 
perhaps a more plausible contention today, in a world of failed states and narco-states, 
than it was in 1975). Oakeshott and Hildebrandt agree that law should neither be 
“sterilized” as an independent construct, nor instrumentalised for economic or 
political purposes (147). 
This recognition of the law as authoritative does not have to be via consent, and the 
law need not serve justice.
8
 There is no contractual relationship, and no moment of 
adoption. Law, for Oakeshott, is a fundamental condition of civil association. It does 
not create an obligation to do anything specific, but rather creates obligations to act in 
a manner consistent with the law. In this sense, law acts adverbially (Hildebrandt: 
“law does not prescribe or describe; it predicts what legal effect will be attached to 
what event, action or state of affairs” – 157). As Hildebrandt notes, complying with 
law is also consistent with challenging it in a court of law, and understanding, 
interpreting, extending and changing operative legal norms (10, 173); the nature of 
law as printed text encourages interpretation and disagreement (177). 
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 It is not entirely clear whether Hildebrandt would endorse this statement.  She wants to avoid 
idealistic renderings that conflate law with justice (147), though is keen that law, even if unjust, aim at 
justice (149). Oakeshott argues that a legal system (lex) has an ‘inner morality’ intrinsic to civil 
association (OHC153n1), and also claims that “no performance is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ in respect of being a 
wish to achieve an imagined satisfaction or in respect of its actual outcome, but only in respect of its 
relationship to a moral practice understood as a composition of rules” (OHC69). However, these 
remarks are somewhat too gnomic to unravel in the space available. 
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Unlike with an enterprise association, failure to comply is not an act of disassociation, 
but it may of course lead to punishment according to the law. Hildebrandt agrees that 
a hallmark of legal rules is that they can be broken (probably with consequences for 
the lawbreaker), which distinguishes the law from discipline and administration (10). 
Oakeshott emphasises the adjudicative function of the law (OHC131), but in terms 
consistent with Hildebrandt’s insistence that law “requires deliberation as well as 
binding decisions” (183). It follows that a mere decision-making mechanism is not 
sufficient for a civil association (unless it is written into law). 
Civil association and law have an internal relationship – it is impossible to have one 
without the other. Hence civil authority isn’t acquired by some sort of act or 
endowment, but resides in the continuous acknowledgement of the law by the citizens 
of the association (OHC154). Individual legal rules, as Hildebrandt notes (10), will 
appear via a valorised process (by a democratic legislator in the jurisdictions of her 
focus, though Oakeshott himself was not one of democracy’s biggest fans); this is part 
of the law defining the civil association. 
Oakeshott argues that the law laid down by a civil association should understand the 
state as societas, not universitas. The law, ideally, will avoid prescriptions about 
behaviour that cannot easily be enforced because they conflict with norms of civil 
conduct (OHC178). Second, the law should ideally only have substantive effects on 
behaviour which has the capacity to harm others (OHC179). This looks very like 
Mill’s harm principle, and subtends a private sphere for the individual. Third, 
innovation should be within the capacity of the association to absorb it (OHC178). 
Because a civil association has a compulsory element (it is hard if not impossible to 
disassociate as an individual), then for Oakeshott it is wrong for the state to pitch 
itself as a universitas, that is, as an enterprise association. Liberty involves being able 
to pursue one’s goals, and not being forced to pursue others, so the state as universitas 
is a tyranny to the extent that it insists on citizens reinforcing the pursuit of its own 
goal. 
The modern state as universitas has a tendency to address tricky, even insoluble, 
problems, such as ‘the problem of the poor’, which Oakeshott characterised as 
reconceptualizing poverty from an issue of embarrassment for a nation, to the 
unproductive use of human ‘assets’ – a reconceptualization that helped bring about 
the enlightened managerial state (OHC303ff., and cf. Hildebrandt at 173). More 
modern examples might be the wars against crime, drugs and terror, as well of course 
as highly technologized ‘real’ warfare itself (OHC272-274). In such a world, where 
the state takes on such responsibilities, the citizen has to render herself legible to the 
state so she can be deployed effectively (Scott 1998). 
For Hildebrandt, this is an immediate potential locus for privacy problems, as privacy 
“presumes that a person can anticipate and co-determine how the environment ‘reads’ 
her” and that “what matters is what others may infer from these data” (102). In order 
to (appear to) control these big issues of poverty, crime etc., the state renders us 
legible, categorises us, and makes us take actions. Inevitable failure to achieve a 
partially-specified goal, together with unintended consequences, require more action, 
and a vicious circle is in operation. 
Hildebrandt also describes a reality in which, although the state does not necessarily 
have a goal beyond self-perpetuation, law is closed down or marginalised by 
technology. She worries about the adequacy of written law to cope in this new world 
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(177). Furthermore, this need not be the state in operation, but a private service 
provider. Once more, Tocqueville anticipated her, but she extends the critique. 
Thus, the ruling power, having taken each citizen one by one into its powerful 
grasp and having molded him to its own liking, spreads its arms over the whole 
of society, covering the surface of social life with a network of petty, 
complicated, detailed, and uniform rules through which even the most original 
minds and the most energetic of spirits cannot reach the light in order to rise 
above the crowd. It does not break men’s wills but it does soften, bend, and 
control them; rarely does it force men to act but it constantly opposes what 
actions they perform; it does not destroy the start of anything but it stands in its 
way; it does not tyrannize but it inhibits, represses, drains, snuffs out, dulls so 
much effort that finally it reduces each nation to nothing more than a flock of 
timid and hardworking animals with the government as shepherd. (de 
Tocqueville 2003, 806). 
Now we hear the cadences of Lessig’s Code (1999), or Zittrain’s The Future of the 
Internet (2008), where architecture intervenes to constrain humanity in pleasant, 
carefully constructed walled gardens. Hildebrandt sets out the means by which 
technology undercuts law to create such structures. First, design is not controlled by a 
democratic (or otherwise) legislator, and, as she points out, we never get to vote on it. 
Second, whereas we have a right to violate the law without dissociating ourselves 
from our fellow citizens, side-stepping the design of a technological device takes us 
out of the association that exists on or via that device. Third, it is hard if not 
impossible to contest the effects of technological architectures, because they are often 
invisible, certainly extremely complex, and not least because there is nowhere to 
contest them (12). 
Hence the dangers, which Oakeshott frames as moral unacceptability, of the state as 
universitas are located in its power to inhibit, repress or snuff out. Bulk data 
gathering, for example, is justified in terms of efficiency, but for Oakeshott the state 
need not be efficient because it is not there to do anything efficiently or badly other 
than provide optimal conditions for civil society. Hildebrandt does not share 
Oakeshott’s scepticism, but neatly states the dilemma of machine learning. 
If the assumptions [of machine learning] restrict the capability of the agent to 
respond to relevant changes in its environment, it will come up with incorrect, 
irrelevant or ineffective solutions. … However, the problem is that if those who 
pay for these systems believe in their objectivity, and act upon their predictions, 
we may not easily learn about the inadequacy. (25) 
Hildebrandt problematises Oakeshott’s distinction, agreeing that individualism and 
the pluralism he regarded as fundamental are undermined by the state as universitas, 
but going further in arguing that even the state as societas may struggle to use state-
of-the-art techniques for its Hobbesian duty of providing security for its citizens. 
The therapeutic state 
Oakeshott discusses the therapeutic state (OHC308ff.), which is the state as 
universitas that goes even further – its goal is the health of its citizens, and it uses its 
authority to enforce behaviour consistent with its own definition of health. The state 
becomes a “sanatorium from which no patient may discharge himself by a choice of 
his own,” eerily reminiscent of the ‘nudge’ programme which has become popular 
amongst paternalistic faux-liberal governments (Halpern 2015). 
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The therapeutic state works to define problems in and improvements to people’s daily 
lives independently of their actual lived experience, as for example the novelist 
Malcolm Lowry (writing of his time as an alcoholic squatter in a beautiful forest near 
Vancouver in the 1940s) describes: 
Often I would linger on the way and dream of our life. Was it possible to be so 
happy? Here we were living on the very window of existence, under conditions 
so poverty stricken and abject in the eyes of the world they were actually 
condemned in the newspapers, or by the Board of Health, and yet it seemed that 
we were in heaven, and that the world outside – so portentous in its 
prescriptions for man of imaginary needs that were in reality his damnation – 
was hell. (Lowry 2009) 
Hildebrandt also weighs in against citizens being addressed, not as members of a civil 
association defined by law, but “as entities whose behaviour must change to achieve 
some greater good,” complaining that “the language has shifted from regulating the 
actions of legal subjects, to regulating the behaviour of groups of individuals” (164-
165). Lessig’s famous argument that behaviour is regulated by law, economic 
incentives, social norms and architecture (Lessig 1999) is “deeply disturbing” (165), 
as it implicitly suggests the interchangeability of these constraints, so that in particular 
a cleverly designed architecture could produce the behaviour change without appeal, 
reducing the burden on the law and forcing the citizen to work toward the greater 
good (184-185). Indeed, the position is worse, in that if behavioural economics can 
show that certain correlations occur under laboratory conditions, the temptation for 
paternalistic policymakers is to reproduce the laboratory conditions in the world 
(O’Hara 2015). The response to a prediction (e.g. that someone is likely to be a 
criminal or terrorist) may inadvertently help to bring the prediction to pass (196-197). 
Law is not, on the Oakeshottian view, a means to an end, however good the end; 
people are not rational agents despised by a system which nudges them into doing 
what they ought to do. Hildebrandt’s slogan remains salutary: my behaviour should 
not be redressed without first addressing me about it (185). For the liberal, this is 
because my liberty or autonomy is infringed by such actions, while for the 
conservative, it is because no-one has the legitimacy to erect a standard against which 
my behaviour can be judged, or the competence to redress my behaviour without 
unintended consequences. 
Hildebrandt’s extensions of and challenges to 
Oakeshottian thought 
Forty years on, it is not surprising that Hildebrandt’s work extends the Oakeshottian 
framework significantly in many ways. In this final section, I will single out three: the 
roles of big data, architecture and pre-emption; the importance of privacy; and the 
nature of agency, especially artificial agency. 
Big data 
Interactions between the state (and also private organisations and service providers) 
and the individual are different because the technological background shifts the entire 
basis of the relationship, as Hildebrandt argues. Interoperability and automatic 
categorisation have replaced meanings and causes (196). So, for instance, she points 
out that: 
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Instead of building on explanation in terms of causes or understanding in terms 
of reasons this kind of knowledge [mined from data] thrives on quantification 
and syntax. Devices and infrastructures that make use of these data mining 
techniques are smart because they are capable of detecting and acting upon 
patterns that are invisible to unmediated human cognition. (26 – cf. also 162-
163 about the normative impact of the car) 
In this spirit, she considers the development and history of the law in a similar spirit to 
Oakeshott’s, but focusing on the technology of print, the affordances this created for 
the law, and the effects it had on institutions such as the state, sovereignty and the rule 
of law (177-181); she follows up with a methodical account of the challenges of 
digital and networked technologies (181-183). This is an important supplement to 
Oakeshott’s account of the development of the state, not least because of her 
consistent technological focus. 
Smart technologies provide a different locus of understanding than, for example, 
Oakeshott’s characterisation of agency in terms of intelligent behaviour. For 
Oakeshott, actions have purposes to resolve desires, about which there is no right or 
wrong, and which generate what Hildebrandt calls “the flux of life” (166). If we take 
away the purposes and desires from the account, and aggregate over many actions 
using this abstracted language, we find statistical regularity (which the methods are 
intended to uncover) rather than the flux which drives our political institutions and 
underpins the need for pluralism. The focus becomes our machine-readable behaviour 
(46), which can easily be calibrated against the requirements of a data architecture 
that eschews the disputes and interpretations characteristic of law in favour of “tacit, 
invisible interpretations … performed by machines that have no use for meaning” 
(181); the new paradigms for behavioural constraint – behavioural economics, 
nudging, data science and cybernetics – are quantitative, and have no need for 
interpretable text (183). The requirement for pluralism therefore drops from the 
political picture, and the state as societas loses a key justification. 
We also lose the first person perspective – the collected becomes the collective. Big 
data relies on a model from which machine learning and knowledge discovery 
techniques can extract correlations. But correlation in the model is not the same as a 
correlation in the world. Worse, the model itself (whether or not it is produced by the 
technology itself) inherits all the problems that Oakeshott adduces of a collective. 
Worse still, “in so far as their focus is entirely on data and analytics, [big data] users 
may never even notice how wrong[ly] they are guided, because the analytics has not 
only become their extended cognition but also their extended perception” (38). 
Borrowing a trope from Morozov (2013), she cites Big Data Solutionism as the 
“tendency to redefine the flux of life in terms of machine-readable data that can be 
operated upon to compute solutions to any computable problem one might want to 
imagine” (166). Ultimately, we individuals may even end up as the cognitive resource 
of the models – our function within the system is to create the data that feeds the beast 
(47), while reciprocity and ambiguity are lost (67). Privacy, identity, autonomy, 
equality before the law, the presumption of innocence and due process are all 
potential casualties. 
The state which makes policy using big data necessarily adopts the position of 
universitas rather than societas, necessarily rejects the first person experiences of its 
citizens in favour of aggregations or abstractions, and compounds these felonies by 
policymaking over the abstractions, managing the correlations, and failing to provide 
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useful feedback mechanisms from those have been abstracted over and who may not 
accept the conclusions of the machine. As Hildebrandt notes (38-39), scientific 
method requires some sort of commitment to testing data mining and the data 
gathered; the consequences of inadequate processing are substantial, especially if a 
smart environment is able to act on the output to the detriment of individuals. 
Big data, the cloud and virtual machines are not ethereal entities. In the 
technologically-mediated spaces about which Hildebrandt writes, metaphors such as 
these should not disguise the fact that immateriality is an illusion; they denote real 
machines located in real places (44-45) which incur real costs (194). Data represents 
partially, and each technique (and data union) will partially reveal signals, which may 
or may not correspond to signals (or the important signals) in the world that is being 
moulded by the actions of smart environments. Different algorithms may produce 
different results on the same data, and although communication between analysts may 
produce some consensus, we are still left with the question of how far we can trust the 
consensus (Silberzahn & Uhlmann 2015), especially if we factor in the fact that data 
scientists and their funders also have interests which guide their data gathering, the 
datasets they purchase access to, the algorithms they use, and the noise they choose to 
reject. 
Privacy and data protection 
Second, Hildebrandt’s main interests are data protection, which post-dated 
Oakeshott’s work, and privacy; in this she naturally goes beyond Oakeshott himself, 
although much of his work is about the relationship between public institutions and 
private individuals. For example, he does not consider the importance of providing 
distance, or safe space, for a member of a civil association (which may be a state) to 
reflect. Hildebrandt gives the example of the “institutionalized pattern of behaviour” 
called politeness as protecting privacy and personal space in Japan (and most likely 
elsewhere – 115). The rules underlying it facilitate interaction between people; in 
Japan, making it possible to conduct an interaction of equals without undermining 
civility, while the participants simulate ignorance of each other’s affairs (118) and lie 
about information they do not want to share (119). The key in these situations is that 
everyone is aware of the rules, and (broadly) of the knowledge that each has about the 
other. Hildebrandt contrasts this situation with that of the US, where privacy should 
not be taken, but need not be given or provided (189). 
Oakeshott argues that the private sphere is the sphere of desires, goals and 
satisfactions. “Enterprise, seeking the satisfaction of wants, cannot be in this sense 
‘public’,9 no matter who is concerned. … Thus, if ruling were itself to be understood 
as the deliberation, the choice, and the execution of a ‘policy’ in which the substantive 
resources of the ruled (their attention, their energy, their time and their wealth) are 
compulsorily or contractually enlisted … in a joint undertaking or series of 
undertakings of which the rulers are the ‘managers’, then it could have no place 
whatever in civil association” (OHC146). Universitas cannot be a civil association, it 
is an enterprise association, and only societas can fill the social need for free agents to 
relate to each other. 
                                                 
9
 I.e. in the following sense: given a particular engagement, the public interest is in a series of 
considerations, set down in law, that are indifferent to its success or failure. Private interests, on the 
other hand, are indeed concerned with its success, or with its failure, or with its specific effects on 
individuals, groups, institutions etc. 
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For Oakeshott, the state as universitas intrudes private interests on the public, which is 
different but not dissimilar to Richard Sennett’s contemporary complaint that the res 
publica has been effaced by the false belief that social meanings are generated by the 
feelings of individuals (Sennett 1977). Both thinkers are interested in the smooth and 
just functioning of public life, and the protection of individuals is not on their radar in 
those works. Oakeshott the conservative is clear: only the state as societas will allow 
individuals to flourish and exercise autonomy, but in his rejection of universitas he 
does not consider what the limits could or should be of a purposive state, how an 
individual should be protected from other private actors, whether they be nosy 
neighbours or Marc Zuckerberg, or the extent to which individuals should be absolved 
from responsibilities to protect themselves (cf. 203ff.). Or, rather, Oakeshott believes 
that they should be protected by the law, but does not specify what that law should or 
could be. Hildebrandt champions data protection for providing “a limited set of rules 
that give clear indications of the conditions for lawful processing, instead of 
depending on a single ambiguous concept” (190, and cf.206), which data subjects can 
believe in as achievable (191). 
Yet an important protection can be developed through reminding ourselves that those 
collecting data have a purpose. Even if our being rendered machine-readable removes 
the discourse of purpose from states’ and companies’ preferred representation of 
social life, those states (universitas) and companies do have purposes for collecting 
data, and must declare these in advance of doing so as a result of data protection rules 
(212). The very aspect of these enterprise associations that prevents them from being 
civil associations can be used to provide accountability and hidden processing. 
Agency revisited 
Third, the onlife world which Hildebrandt describes sets a challenge to Oakeshott’s 
rejection of collectivity as a locus of agency. Her characterisation of the extended 
social mind (e.g. 46) is the sort of collective state of affairs that Oakeshott disregards 
as a “corrupt and corrupting expression.” Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the 
collectivisation of data-driven agency. Oakeshott argues that “the arts of agency are 
nowhere and never to be found save in the understanding of adepts” (OHC87), yet 
Hildebrandt begs to differ. 
There is work to be done to reconcile these two accounts, but I do not think it 
impossible. The lines of a reconciliation would involve work on two concepts. First of 
all there is the constraint of behaviour afforded by an environment. Lessig’s argument 
is discussed and critiqued by Hildebrandt, as we have seen. Oakeshott, however, with 
his focus on individual action only really discusses three of the four constraints from 
Lessig’s account. The affordances of architectures (which need not be digital, but 
could be provided by any artificial environment) would need to be placed into the 
Oakeshottian framework. Hildebrandt does not make concrete suggestions and poses 
this as an open question. Though we need to “learn how to integrate legal norms in 
pre-emptive computing systems”, we also have to “develop new ways to preserve 
what differentiates law from administration and techno-regulation” (218). 
Secondly, and relatedly, Oakeshott stresses the contribution made by individual 
agents, whereas in a modern civil association legitimacy and responsibility are quite 
often distributed around the system and hard to locate at a particular person or point. 
Collective interests and governmental purposes are tricky to disentangle from 
collected interests of individuals and the optimal conditions for civil society 
(Flathman 2005), and Oakeshott’s ideas, as Hildebrandt implicitly demonstrates, need 
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to be augmented with a more realistic account of the use of authority and the 
affordances of the Hobbesian state (Galston 2012). It may be that one route to this is 
to explore the idea of extended cognition (Clark 1997). This is, as I have argued 
elsewhere, a potential tool in the toolbox of conservative political psychology 
(O’Hara 2014), and Hildebrandt brings the concept into her work. An individual’s 
extended cognition, when augmented with social resources, becomes socialised and 
less individual as a result; it may be that consideration of this issue will help plug the 
gap in Oakeshott’s framework. 
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